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2INTRODUCTION
The threat of HIV/AIDS, SARS, West Nile virus, meningitis, polio, and most 
recently the avian influenza, not to mention many various other devastating diseases that 
have graced headlines the past few months and years, have increasingly challenged the 
traditional definition of “national security.”   Whether we are safe from attacks by foreign 
militaries or not, the spread of such diseases has brought to question the role of nation-
states in preventing the spread or impact of infectious disease to provide “security” for 
their citizens. 
 In its discussion of the threat of global infectious disease and its implications for 
U.S. national security, this thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: Is global 
health, or more specifically, the spread of infectious diseases, considered a security 
concern?  To what extent is the spread of infectious diseases abroad a concern of U.S. 
national security?  Given these factors, to what extent is the threat of infectious disease 
from abroad changing the domestic landscape of U.S. national security?  In order to 
address these questions, I will use the recent threat of avian influenza as a case study.  
While the implications of my questions on foreign policy are large, focusing on this 
specific case can help illuminate the issue of how threats of infectious diseases abroad 
can be dealt with by our government, thus shedding light on the current working 
definition of national security. 
 These questions have primarily risen from serious real-world events concerning 
the spread and threat of infectious diseases.  Although my thesis will elaborate on this 
discussion, it is important to touch on this issue here to justify the importance and 
urgency of examining this topic. 
3Practically, there is evidence that new and existing diseases are entering American 
territory in ever increasing numbers.  Nearly 30 diseases, including HIV, West Nile virus, 
Lyme disease, Legionnaires’ disease, and hanta virus pulmonary syndrome were first 
recognized in the “latter half of the 20th century in the United States.  Multidrug-resistant 
TB, antibiotic-resistant Streptococcus phenumoniae (the bacteria that cause ear 
infections), pneumonia, meningitis, rabies, and diarrheal disease caused by 
Cryptosporidium parvum and by E. coli OH157 all also surged at the end of the 1900s.”1
Roughly a quarter of all deaths in the world are attributed to infectious diseases, with 
HIV, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and malaria parasites as the top three pathogens 
resulting in death.2 While travel and migration are not new concepts, the scale, speed, 
and depth of interconnectedness of both people and goods continues to increase.3 In turn, 
this increases the ability of pathogens to not simply spread to new hosts, but to do so with 
increasing speed and depth.  Each day, more than 1.4 million people cross international 
borders via air travel.4 The number of refugees has soared; it is estimated that currently 
35 million people are fleeing war or persecution.5 The estimated size of the foreign-born 
population in the United States in March 2000 was 29 million.6 Sex tourism and the 
importation of food and alien plans are other examples of the ways in which pathogens 
can be spread worldwide.  The movements of persons as a result of networks created by 
 
1 Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious 
Diseases: Reconciling U.S. National Security and Public Health Policy (Pittsburg: 
RAND, 2003) 62-63. 
2 Mary E. Wilson, “Health and Security: Globalization of Infectious Diseases,” in Global 
Health Challenges for Human Security, eds. Lincoln Chen, Jennifer Leaning, and Vasant 
Narashimhan (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2003) 87. 
3 Wilson, “Health and Security,” 89. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 90. 
6 Ibid. 
4globalization is rapidly increasing, which is worrisome when one realizes the growing 
playground to which pathogens have access.  All of this has created an unstable situation 
for all states of this increasingly globalized world.  With nation-states as the primary 
actors of the international system, their role in the health security of their citizens has 
been a topic of increasing discussion. 
 This thesis will first argue that the theoretical conception of security is changing 
to one founded in human security, the concept that states must not only protect but also 
meet the daily needs of individuals.  Specifically, the U.S. conception of national security 
is also evolving to focus on the basic needs of individuals and address health security as a 
result of the end of the Cold War, the effects of globalization, and September 11.  This 
section will require a descriptive methodological approach along with this theoretical 
discussion.  Next, we argue that the practical threat to U.S. national security by infectious 
diseases is, in fact, serious and pressing.  This discussion will again require a descriptive 
analysis to point out relevant facts and trends.    
 After addressing these broad issues, we will take an in-depth look at the recent 
threat of an avian influenza pandemic and use this case study to argue that infectious 
diseases are, in fact, considered a security issue, and thus that the notion of human 
security is prevailing. Specifically, U.S. policymakers have framed the avian flu as a 
security issue because it coincides with President Bush’s larger security goals, it is seen 
as a fairly quick, low-cost solution to prove the government’s capability in the wake of 
September 11 and Hurricane Katrina.  Because the government as a whole has received 
criticism after September 11 and Hurricane Katrina, both Republicans and Democrats 
have supported domestic and international action to prevent an avian flu.  Furthermore, 
5the fact that the government, rather than public health officials or private doctors, have 
taken up the cause shows that the issue is more than just a health concern but is important 
for national security. Additionally, officials have been focused more on domestic 
prevention instead of international prevention or intervention, which shows that the issue 
is important for national security.  Overall, this thesis argues that global health, 
specifically the threat of infectious disease, is of increasing importance to U.S. security, 
both due to practical threats and theoretical changes in concepts of security, and that this 
new focus of security is making “national security” an issue to be addressed by an 
increasing variety of domestic and international agencies. 
 
Roadmap 
 This paper will be organized around the theoretical debate on health security as 
well as an in-depth analysis of the way in which the threat of the avian influenza 
pandemic has been viewed by the public and handled by the U.S. government.   
 The first chapter will involve the theoretical discussion of health security with 
concepts of human security.  We will show that the definition of human security is slowly 
dominating realism, and with it comes a greater concern for human health.   
 Chapter two will examine the public’s response and the government’s action to 
prevent an avian influenza pandemic, primarily during 2005.  This case study is used 
because the general public as well as public health and government officials concur that 
the threat is serious and pressing.  If not adequately monitored and reacted to if an 
outbreak does occur, officials are comparing the devastation to the influenza pandemic of 
1918, with tens or even hundreds of millions of people dying worldwide.  The U.S. 
6government has taken considerable action, both on the domestic and international front in 
order to both prevent a pandemic and combat one with vaccines and preparedness 
policies if it was to erupt.  Finally, it is most important to note that while U.S. citizens are 
worried by the threat, and while the government has committed billions of dollars to the 
issue, in over a year of its existence, it has not harmed an American citizen nor been 
found on American soil.  These facts make the avian influenza a particularly interesting 
disease to study in the context of U.S. national security.  It not only proves that the threat 
of infectious diseases itself is a cause for government action, both domestically and 
internationally, but also points to human security as the dominant or at least growing 
definition of national security.   
7CHAPTER 1: HUMAN SECURITY
The formation of the United Nations after World War II signified a change in 
international politics.  To prevent against future atrocities, the delegation at the San 
Francisco conference decided that the rights of individuals must never be forgotten.  The 
end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization have also pointed towards the 
decreasing power of the nation-state, and thus the increasing emphasis on providing for 
the needs of individuals.  As Realism is in its decline, I argue that human security is 
slowly but steadily dominating theories of international relations.  By focusing on 
meeting the needs of individuals, rather than the power-politics of nation-states, human 
security offers a foundation for discussing the spread of infectious diseases as a security 
issue.     
The broad goal of security is to not only offer protection, but to ensure that people 
are able to live freely without fear for their lives, with the ability to pursue their wishes.  
If this is the true underlying meaning of security, then security is not only the “absence of 
war and conflict, but also the control of infectious diseases, the prevention of 
impoverishment, the elimination of illiteracy, and the protection of people from sudden 
reversals that threaten the quality of their daily lives.”7 This points to the foundation of 
human security; nation-states must not only have a responsibility to their citizens to 
protect them from attacks by other nation-states, but to also protect against a broader set 
of international threats.   
 
7 Lincoln Chen, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Ellen Seidensticker, eds., “New Threats to 
Human Security,” in Human Insecurity in a Global World (Cambridge: Harvard 
University, 2003) vii. 
8While I will discuss the specifics of how health is a security concern later in the 
thesis, this chapter articulates the nature and necessity of human security.  First, it will 
outline the historical foundations of the theory, beginning with the United Nations’ San 
Francisco conference and leading to the more recent Commission on Human Security.  
My definition of human security, from which I will frame the rest of my thesis, agrees 
with the definition set forth by the Commission on Human Security.  Next, this chapter 
will present a literature review of varying definitions of human security.  It will then 
discuss the theory’s necessity in today’s world, arguing that the end of the Cold War and 
the rise in globalization give human security ever increasing value from its inception in 
1945.   We will also analyze the debate between realism and human security and will 
argue that human security achieves in offering an accurate theory of international politics 
where Realism fails.  I will discuss human security as a necessary global public good and 
finally examine critiques of the theory and appropriate responses. 
 
History of Human Security 
The notion of human security was first evident in the June 1945 San Francisco 
Conference, which created the United Nations.  The U.S. Secretary of State, Edward 
Rielly Stettinius, Jr., stated, “The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts.  The first 
is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear.  The second is the economic 
and social front where victory means freedom from want.”8 Instead of being concerned 
with weapons, he argued that “[human security] is a concern with human life and 
 
8 Sabina Alkire, “Concepts of Human Security,” in Alkire et al., op. cit., 19.  Cited from 
UNDP (1994) 3.  
9dignity.”9 After the world saw the atrocities of World War II, which occurred in the 
traditional world of national security, the new emphasis on “human security” was one of 
the ways seen to be able to uphold the promise of “never again.”   
 Since the San Francisco Conference, human security is often associated with the 
1994 United Nations Human Development Report on Human Security.10 The report 
defined human security as: “Safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and 
repression; protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – 
whether in jobs, in homes, or in communities.”11 This definition is developed in relation 
to seven dimensions of human security: personal, environmental, economic, political, 
community, health, and food security.12 The report also identified four essential 
characteristics of human security.  These include:  
1) Human security is a universal concern.  It is relevant to people everywhere, in 
rich nations and poor.  2) The components of human security are interdependent.  
3) Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later 
intervention.  It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream.  4) 
Human security is people centered.  It is concerned with how people live and 
breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much 
access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in 
conflict or in peace.13 
Human security was again a topic of discussion in the UNDP in 1999.  Its Human 
Development Report on Globalization returned to human security in the context of the 
1998 Asian financial crisis.  Among other instances, it called for specific action to 
increase human security in times of economic crisis.14 
9 Alkire, “Concepts of Human Security,” 19.  
10 Ibid., 18. 
11 Ibid., 19. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
10
It has also been argued that the discussion of human security culminated in the 
creation of an independent international Commission on Human Security in 2001, co-
chaired by former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, and Nobel Prize 
economist, Professor Amartya Sen.15 The Commission was created through the initiative 
of the government of Japan after the UN Secretary General called for a world “free of 
want” and “free of fear” at the 2000 Millennium Summit.16 The Commission’s final 
report, published in May 2003, outlines a definition of human security:  
...to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human 
freedoms and human fulfillment.  Human security means protecting fundamental 
freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life.  It means protecting people from 
critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations.  It means using 
processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations.  It means creating 
political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that 
together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity.17 
The Commission also discusses human security as a people-centered approach, with the 
purpose of protecting people from not only uniformed troops, but from a wide range of 
threats, including “environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population 
movements, such infectious diseases as HIV/AIDS and long-term conditions of 
oppression and deprivation.”18 Instead of states as sole actors, human security recognizes 
regional and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and civil 
society in managing the broad range of human security issues.  The report also 
emphasizes the importance and necessity of empowering people to contribute to their 
own security.   
 
15 Chen, et al., vii. 
16 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: United Nations, 
2003) http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/
17 Ibid., 1.  
18 Ibid., 6. 
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Finally, the Commission writes, “Human security and state security are mutually 
reinforcing and dependent on each other.”19 They argue that where state security is more 
narrowly focused, human security is broad.  Instead of only being focused on military 
power, human security is concerned with human rights, with a broad range of 
deprivations, and with violent conflict, bother inter- and inner-state.  In order to provide 
for such an expansive view of human security, the Commission advocates for expanding 
peoples’ real freedoms.  This requires not only protection from various threats, but also 
empowerment so that people can “develop their resilience to difficult conditions.”20 The 
Commission also calls on the international community to further strengthen international 
institutions in order to provide for human security.  They argue that because of the 
increasing interdependence among states, especially on issues of global scale, the 
international community as a whole must work together to provide freedoms and thus 
human security.21 
Varying Definitions of Human Security 
 Advocates of human security believe that despite the many differences of people 
throughout the world, they also share commonalities, including “a desire for physical 
security, access to economic opportunities that go beyond mere economic survival, 
freedom of speech and of association, legal and political rights that include the right to 
association, the right to express and practise one’s own religion, and fair and equitable 
 
19 Commission on Human Security, 6. 
20 Ibid., 10. 
21 Ibid., 12. 
12
treatment, including the right of due process, in a court of law.”22 Together, these form 
the three dimensions of human security, according to Hampson and Daudelin: freedom 
from fear/safety of peoples; freedom from want/equality and social justice; and 
liberty/rights and rule of law.23 By focusing on the safety of all peoples, human security 
is somewhat of a humanitarian concept.  It presumes that by addressing the “underlying 
causes of conflicts and violence,” such as “economic despair, social justice, and political 
oppression,” wars can be prevented.24 
Besides the landmark definitions created primarily by the United Nations, many 
other authors have contributed to the understanding of human security within the broad 
framework of consensus as described by Hampson and Daudelin above.  Alkire provides 
an overview of the various contributions by authors to the definition of human security.  
She argues that there are currently 25 definitions of human security, with increasingly 
wide usability.25 
First, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
discusses human security as an emerging concept, which “means the security of people—
their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and 
worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”26 While some critics of human security argue that definitions are too 
expansive and vague, this report argues that a broad view is needed for governments to 
 
22 Fen Olser Hampson, Jean Daudelin, John B. Hay, Todd Martin, and Holly Reid, 
Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 15. 
23 Ibid.,16. 
24 Ibid., 17. 
25 Alkire, “Concepts of Human Security,” 15.  See chart in Appendix A. 
26 Ibid., 26, as cited from in The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001). 
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fully address the various threats to humans.  It states, “Being wedded still to too narrow a 
concept of ‘national security’ may be one reason why many governments spend more to 
protect their citizens against undefined external military attack than to guard them against 
the omnipresent enemies of global health and other real threats to human security on a 
daily basis.”27 Furthermore, the report argues that international institutions have a 
responsibility to safeguard human security, including human rights and human dignity, 
when states fail to do so.28 
Alkire also points to other leading authors in their definitions and discussions of 
human security.  Rothschild places human security in a historical context, arguing that 
human security is one part of “extended security,” which she bases “in conceptual 
antecedents in European political thought.”29 Other authors, including King and Murray 
and Thomas, address the “freedom from need or vulnerability aspect of human security, 
whether this is caused by war or by structural events such as financial crisis.”30 King and 
Murray focus on issues associated with freedom from want by arguing that human 
security is an individual’s “expectation of a life without experiencing the state of 
generalized poverty.”31 Thomas views human security as entailing a wide range of 
freedoms, including “basic material needs, human dignity, and democracy.”32 While 
 
27 Alkire, “Concepts of Human Security,” 16, as cited from International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty Report, 13-15. 
28 Ibid., 27. 
29 Ibid., 22. 
30 Ibid., 23. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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conflict-related threats have not decreased in value according to these authors, they 
instead look to the deeper roots of poverty as causes for security issues.33 
For Hampson, security is defined as the “absence of threat to core human values, 
including the most basic human value, the physical safety of the individual…”34 In 
addition, Hampson views human security as an underprovided public good.  Thus, he 
calls market and political failures into question, as he believes they have inevitably led to 
such under-provisions.35 Leaning and Arie base their definition in the “human 
development and capability approach, yet [they emphasize] the psychological and the 
non-material aspects of security.”36 Human security is thus a precondition for human 
development.    
 Another human security theorist, Paris, argues that human security is identified as 
“a broad category of research on military and/or non-military threats to societies, groups 
and individuals.”37 However, he criticizes other definitions of human security for being 
too expansive and vague, “encompassing everything from physical security to 
psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the 
prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to 
be studied.”38 While theoretical definitions of human security are important, Paris 
stresses the necessity of utility when creating definitions of security.  Similarly, Buzan 
 
33 Alkire, “Concepts of Human Security,” 24. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 25. 
38 Ibid., 33, as cited from Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 
International Security 26:2 (2001) 88. 
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Weaver and de Wilde criticize human security for being incoherent.39 Others argue that 
the specification of human security is arbitrary.40 
As is indicated in Alkire’s expansive overview of the various contending authors 
of human security, the definitions vary in terms of their broadness.  In fact, it seems that 
the primary debate between authors of human security is the argument between the 
broadness and narrowness of the definition.  Owen distinguishes authors of human 
security into these two separate camps with clarity.  Authors who argue for a narrow 
focus cite “pragmatism, conceptual clarity, and analytical rigor as reasons to focus human 
security on violent threats.”41 They argue that pointing towards the lowest common 
denominator of “individual vulnerability and well-being under the rubric of security” is 
not useful.42 If the definition of security is to be used to make policy decisions, security 
must be clear with specific recommendations.  Owen cites authors within this narrow 
camp as Krause, Mack, and Macfarlane, and says that each argues for the inclusion of 
violence into traditional security thinking.  They base this argument on the normative fact 
that 95% of all warfare is now within, rather than between states. 
 Alternatively, those among the broad camp of human security argue that the 
definition should be highly inclusive, more than just the safety from violent threats.  
Authors including Leaning, Alkire, Thakur, Axworthy, Bajpai, Hampson, and Winslow 
and Eriksen cite the substantive importance of a wider range of issues, including poverty, 
 
39 Alkire, “Concepts of Human Security,” 33. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Taylor Owen, “Human Security—Conflict, Critique, and Consensus: Colloquium 
Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition,” Security Dialogue 35 (SAGE 
Publications, 2004) 375. 
42 Ibid. 
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disease, and environmental disasters.43 This view has become broader with the creation 
of the Commission on Human Security, and their definition provided in 2003, as 
discussed above.  They argue that human security includes “all critical and pervasive 
threats to the vital core ‘consistent with long term [human] flourishing.’”44 
Owen attempts to create a “hybrid” definition of human security to address both 
the broad and narrow proponents.  His threshold definition first takes from the 
Commission on Human Security’s belief that “‘human security is the protection of the 
vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats.’”45 This establishes 
severity, immediacy, and scope.  However, the second part of Owen’s definition provides 
clarity on the scope of issues that human security should address.  He writes, “[H]uman 
security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive 
environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats.”46 
However, despite this apparent “broad versus narrow” argument within human 
security, Owen contends that the theory is actually not so polarized.  Instead, the main 
difference is only when regarding appropriate policy responses, rather than the actual 
merits of specific threats to human security.  This brings us to questions of the usefulness 
of human security when it comes to policy decisions.  Owen points out that the broadness 
of human security can result in an overlapping of interests from various professional 
fields, including development and humanitarian organizations, to conflict resolution.  
 
43 Owen, 375. 
44 Ibid., 376. 
45 Ibid., 382. 
46 Ibid., 383. 
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Such interdisciplinary approaches can decrease policy redundancies and increase 
effectiveness to create “integrated solutions to real-world problems.”47 
Additionally, others argue that human security gives a voice to those who might 
otherwise be politically marginalized.  It can also be a rational response to the 
increasingly global nature of topics within international politics.  Owen writes, 
“Governments of various scales must take on a wider mandate than simply economic 
growth, political stability, and invasion by foreign armies.”48 Finally, human security can 
be used to re-evaluate our understanding of sovereignty.  Instead at looking at state 
sovereignty legitimized by the international community, human security encourages 
legitimacy to be defined according to the citizens of the state.49 Thus, under human 
security, states can only be legitimate sovereign entities if they meet the demands and 
needs of their citizens.  By placing the person at the center of international politics, 
human security provides a policy framework by which to solve problems of war and 
deprivation at their core.  Instead of consistently looking to states to define their interests 
as a whole among the international community, human security challenges states to look 
inward to determine their policy goals.  
 
The Necessity of the Theory of Human Security 
 There is evidence that human security concerns are becoming more apparent in 
international politics.  Today, human security is a prevalent theory of international 
security due to at least seven factors, according to Hampson et al.  First, Hampson argues 
 
47 Owen, 377. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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that international institutions have been developed to strengthen the protection of a wide 
spectrum of human rights.  They argue that this has been done at both the global and 
regional levels.50 Second, democracy has increased after the end of the Cold War as the 
“preferred system of government in the world.”51 As democracy promotes the rule of law 
and protects human rights, so does its spread increase the prevalence of human security 
concerns.  Third, non-governmental organizations have had an increasing impact, 
especially within humanitarian and development fields.  They have thus “raised the 
profile of human security concerns by stressing the need to address the plight of refugees 
and particularly vulnerable groups...”52 Fourth, Hampson argues that the media has 
increased awareness on humanitarian issues, promoting issues of human security.53 Fifth, 
Hampson contends that a new tier of “middle powers” is emerging within international 
politics, further promoting human security.  Next, he argues that economic globalization 
is redefining relationships between states and peoples.  Finally, international conflict is 
changing, increasing in inner-state rather than inter-state violence.54 
During the Cold War, the definition of international security was one of national 
security, founded in Realism’s belief that a nation-state’s primary concern is its own self-
interest in order to survive.  While “high” politics referred to national security, “low” 
politics were concerned with international trade and other international non-military 
 
50 Hampson, et al., 8-9. 
51 Ibid., 8. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid.,8-9. 
54 Ibid., 10. 
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transactions.  Hampson and Daudelin argue that the Middle East War and oil shocks in 
the 1970s lessened this distinction between “high” and “low” politics.55 
“High” politics have further decreased in importance as the number of armed 
conflict has decreased in the last decade.  The 2005 United Nations Human Security 
Report argues that conflicts are down by 40% since 1992.56 In addition, the average 
number of people killed per battle is down, from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002.  The 
nature of such conflicts has also changed, since wars are no longer primarily fought by 
large, mechanized armies, but are fought “in poor countries with small arms and light 
weapons between weak government forces and ill-trained rebels.”57 However, although 
armed conflict has decreased, the recent Human Security Report also argues that we must 
not become complacent.  It argues that “underlying causes of conflict are rarely 
addressed, so the risk of new wars breaking out and old ones restarting remains real.”58 
In addition, while the nature of armed conflict is changing, “soft threats” of hunger, 
sanitation and diseases are more serious threats to many people throughout the world.59 
It can also be argued that these “soft threats” are causal factors in many conflicts, as well 
as the resulting conditions of many conflicts.  Nevertheless, with or without an actual 
conflict involved, these “soft threats” pose enough problems in and of themselves, thus 
making them security issues. 
 In addition to the changing landscape of national security due to the end of the 
Cold War, globalization has been a primary motivator for the evolution towards human 
 
55 Hampson, et al., 14. 
56 Ramesh Thakur, “Report to UN highlights need to define national security in human 
terms,” Canberra Times, October 17, 2005, A11. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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security.  Globalization, by increasing interactions between people and goods, and in 
many cases decreasing the impermeability of borders, has created an environment of 
rapid change.  According to Chen, such rapid change not only means quickly changing 
financial flows, but the ability of diseases to spread easily and reach endemic proportions.  
He argues, “The increasing global threats to human security are outgrowing national 
abilities to tackle them, and outpacing international responses.”60 
Chen argues that human security can be useful for making the outcomes of 
globalization “better for people, adding value to existing perspectives such as poverty, 
inequality, human rights and conflict resolution and prevention.”61 By focusing on the 
“well-being and dignity of people rather than on the protection of national borders,” 
human security provides a more complete set of criteria necessary for “assessing the 
impact of globalization on human well-being, encompassing as it does socio-economic 
aspects and personal safety from the consequences of violent conflicts.”62 Human 
security is unique in that it takes globalization into consideration and focuses on the 
“risks of sudden change for the worst,” whether it be a disease outbreak or a financial 
crisis.63 We must remember that these global crises affect all persons, not only the 
world’s poor, which further makes human security an important theory to take into 
consideration.  While it may be an important theory to address development in the third 
world, it is applicable and necessary for all states and for the collective international 
community. 
 
60 Chen, Human Insecurity in a Global World, 4.
61 Ibid., 1. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 5. 
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As a framework for understanding the human impact of globalization, human 
security “covers insecurities related to the failure to meet basic economic and social 
needs as well as those related to conflicts between groups and nations, and the failures of 
communities, nations and the global community to provide protection against threats.”64 
Comprehensive in nature, human security goes beyond national boundaries to address 
global problems.  Chen argues that human security addresses new “insecurities” that 
result from globalization, including global crime, human trafficking, instability and 
contagion in financial markets, labor market instabilities and threats to job security, 
spread of diseases, and conflicts within national borders.  Globalization also increases 
interactions between people, exacerbating the spread of diseases and making containment 
more difficult.65 Chen argues that current economic liberalization “goes against the 
imperative of a response.”  He writes, “Strong profit incentives drive investment in 
research and development for treatments and cures, but this also restricts access to those 
with purchasing power.”66 Despite economic liberalization as a result of globalization, 
Chen argues that governments must provide for basic health needs as a global public 
good founded in moral necessity. 
Refuting Realism 
Human security most starkly refutes the theory of Realism.  Realism is founded 
on the assumptions that the nation-state is the primary actor of the international system 
and that the international system is anarchic—there is no overarching authority.  This 
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makes for a world of constant competition.  Realism is also founded on the assumption 
that all states inherently possess offensive military capability, if not through weapons, at 
least through their population.  Under Realism, states are also always unsure of the 
actions and intentions of other states.  Finally, the basic motive of all states is survival, 
and states think strategically and rationally on how to survive in an anarchic world. 67 
Mearsheimer argues that these assumptions result in three patterns of behavior.  
First, in an anarchic international system in which every state is most concerned with its 
own survival and has at least a certain amount of military capacity, states fear each other.  
Each state aims to guarantee its own survival; in order to do so, they seek maximum 
relative power positions over other states.68 In a Realist world, states are constantly 
competing, creating an international system of uncertainty. 
Brown is one author who refutes the validity of Realism from the human security 
perspective.  He argues that the contemporary world society suffers from an international 
crisis, which is the “incongruence between the traditional state-sovereignty system and 
the increasing interdependence of peoples.”  He writes that Realism is “unable to 
comprehend, let alone counter, the structural contradictions underlying the contemporary 
security threats.”69 Instead, Brown argues that policies and institutions must be 
“informed by a concept of world interests that focuses on the needs of humankind as a 
whole and that can provide a basis for reconciling or arbitrating among conflicting 
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national, international, and subnational interests.”70 Within an anarchic international 
system, Realism provides structure by making nation-states both the “agents and objects 
of the most significant occurrences in world politics.”71 Individuals must look to the 
nation-state for protection and to provide or support basic needs.  Thus, states and 
statesmen work for the “national interest,” the “safety and well-being of the nation as a 
whole.”72 
While military power must be taken into consideration within an anarchic world 
polity, this is not sufficient in itself.  Brown questions the “realistic capability” of 
Realism to provide “contemporary statespersons and citizens in making policy choices 
that are rational (let alone morally tenable) in the sense of servicing their basic interests 
and values.”73 He argues that focusing on war ignores various other international 
disputes that are increasingly relevant with globalization, such as trade, monetary, 
ecological and immigration policies.74 
Brown describes and ranks “world interests,” or “conditions that are desirable for 
the entire planet Earth viewed as an entity.”75 They include: survival of the human 
species, reduction in the amount of killing and other extremely brutal treatment of human 
beings, provision of conditions for healthy subsistence to all people, protection of citizen 
rights, preservation of cultural diversity, preservation of the planet’s basic natural 
ecologies and environments, and enhancement of accountability.76 Brown argues that the 
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survival of the human species, which he describes as “in a reasonably healthy condition 
of body of mind,” should be the “cardinal world interest.”77 Brown argues that state 
action should be focused on not only ensuring the survival of its citizens, but the human 
species as a whole.  Furthermore, despite the fact that individual states and the 
international community through the United Nations insist upon a certain degree of 
human rights, an international system with nation-states as primary actors focuses more 
on states’ interests as a whole, rather than “human rights.”78 Thus, Brown argues that a 
more applicable theory of international relations must understand the increasing inter-
state need for and practice of cooperation.  
Brown founds his argument in ethical beliefs.  He writes:  
The elevation of this objective [conditions for healthy subsistence to all people] to 
the level of a world interest emanates from the fundamental ethical premise that 
the most basic human right is the right to live one’s naturally given right (the sine 
qua non of other rights)—a right that can be negated not only by physical violence 
but also by the denial of the requisites for human survival: uncontaminated and 
adequate water, food, and air; shelter against climatic extremes; and protection 
against disease.79 
Clearly, Realism is inadequate not only because it fails to take into account the various 
ways that states interact post-Cold War, but it also fails to uphold an ethical argument for 
the right of every person to simply live. If states, as the largest social constructs accorded 
the responsibility of protection do not uphold this natural right, who will? 
Realism was the dominant theory of international relations during the Cold War, 
and perhaps rightly so since military capacity meant power; without it, the very 
sovereignty of states was threatened.  Yet the end of the Cold War brought forth new 
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theories of international relations.  Human security is one of the more recent, and 
growing, such theories.  In addition to providing a new post-Cold War framework, human 
security offers a necessary discussion of security in an increasingly connected, globalized 
world, in which threats may be no longer constrained to borders. 
 
Human Security as a Global Public Good 
 Hampson and Zacher discuss human security as a global public good.  First, they 
identify characteristics of global public goods as having “universality of benefits, non-
excludability of benefits, and non-rivalness of benefits (or jointness of supply).”80 For 
human security to be defined as a public good, everyone must benefit, and adding more 
consumers must not increase costs.  Yet making human security a global public good 
becomes difficult as states must work together to provide such goods.  Unless actually 
upheld by international institutions, the idea of global public goods is difficult to provide 
since states may free-ride off other states.81 
However, although Hampson and Zacher argue that human security should be a 
public good, they do acknowledge that some international regulations regarding health 
have not produced results.  Instead, they write that the “…only practical way of reducing 
the international spread of diseases was by assisting developing states in improving their 
health practices, which would consequently reduce the incidence of highly infectious 
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diseases among their own [developed] nations.”82 Thus, while it should be a global 
public good, it seems that the best way to practically supply such a good is to do so 
through increasing individual state capacity.  If this is the case, Hampson and Zacher do 
have some amount of faith in the World Bank and major foundations in providing 
assistance to individual states, especially the Gates foundation, as their roles have been 
growing within the international community.83 
Hampson and Zacher cite five reasons why international collaboration around 
providing health security as a public good is lacking.  They argue that the spread of 
epidemic diseases has recently dropped, decreasing concern by the international 
community; that developed states do not need help from the international community 
because they have the infrastructure in place to address such health issues; that 
developing countries worry that reporting disease outbreaks will cause more negative 
impacts than positive solutions; that other actors, such as non-profits, have taken 
responsibility for providing services that would otherwise be handled by inter-
governmental agencies; and that the increasing number of international travelers has 
made it more difficult to screen them for diseases.84 To elaborate, if developing countries 
adopt such regulations, they risk trade and travel restrictions if they report outbreaks; 
additionally, they may lack the basic resources to even be able to report or address 
outbreaks.85 Also, if non-profits and other non-state actors, such as Medecins Sans 
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Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), are addressing such problems, some argue that 
there is no need for inter-governmental agencies to do the same.86 
Criticisms of Human Security 
 Human security is critiqued on both its theory and its policy implications.  In 
terms of its theory, critics argue that shifting the notion of security towards the individual 
“proliferates the concept without adding any analytic value—the more harms that are 
labeled ‘security threats’, the harder it is to study the relations between them.”87 These 
authors argue that threats must be clearly defined and studied separately.  Practically 
speaking, the broadness of human security means that prioritizing political action can be 
quite difficult, if not impossible.  Additionally, grouping all such topics under the 
umbrella of “security” could result in addressing issues of social welfare through 
inappropriate methods, such as militaristic solutions.88 
Furthermore, some critics argue that human security dilutes the meaning of 
security by focusing too much on global problems, or even on topics in other countries.  
Specifically, Krause argues that we should not base our own security on issues of 
humanitarian concern in other countries.  Yet in response, others argue that globalization 
means that issues in foreign countries are increasingly relevant to our own interests.  For 
example, the socio-economic environment of the Middle East can result in a breeding 
ground for terrorists.  However, defenders of human security also argue that we must not 
only think of such cases in terms of our own military security; first, militarized 
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humanitarian assistance may not be the most effective, and second, we must be focused 
on the interests of people. 
 Finally, there is the critique that “security” is linked with violence alone, and that 
refocusing the definition towards more liberal causes is simply just a “repackaging of a 
liberal humanitarian order.”89 Owen points out that this was the center of debate at the 
International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2002.  While 
rebuttals have been largely in the form of arguments against Realism, proponents of 
human security again argue that the astonishing number of preventable deaths due to non-
military factors or inner-state violence cannot be addressed solely by states alone.90 
Furthermore, an interdisciplinary approach to threats to security can better address such 
concerns instead of only looking at such issues through a military perspective.  Even if 
inter-state violence was the only threat to human existence, as traditional security 
maintains, addressing inter-state violence purely in militaristic terms can fail to fully 
address the issue.  Instead, human security focuses on the underlying problems of both 
inner- and inter-state violence as well as other threatening issues. 
 
Health and Human Security 
 
This analysis of human security shows that the theory is not only viable, but also 
increasingly relevant.  Under the definition set forth by the Commission on Human 
Security, it is clear that the threat of infectious disease is a reasonable security issue.  
Both outbreaks and epidemics of diseases are of concern as the definition calls for the 
protection of people from both critical and pervasive threats.  While diseases can have 
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negative impacts on the wellbeing of a state’s economy or government, human security 
ultimately argues that these are secondary to the primary threat that diseases have on 
individuals.  Again, the focus of human security is not on the state but on the freedoms of 
humans, making the threat of infectious diseases of even greater importance, as 
individuals are ultimately the ones that must fight against pathogens.    
 As Realism is in its decline, human security argues that the international 
community must strengthen as a whole to address such global issues.  Regional and 
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society must all 
work together to provide global public goods.  Health care is one such global public 
good, especially as globalization is increasing the possibilities of the depth, breadth, and 
speed of the transmission of infectious diseases.  With human security as a framework, it 
is imperative that the international community collaborate to prevent against a broader 
range of threats to individuals.  Yet while the protection against the spread of infectious 
diseases clearly falls under the realm of human security, it is still necessary to examine 
the extent to which the spread of diseases are of actual threat to individuals, a task that 
will be undertaken in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: AVIAN INFLUENZA
The avian flu is a useful case study to argue that the definition of national security 
is changing to one based on human security.  First, the worldwide impact until April 21, 
2006 has resulted in no more than 113 deaths, with 204 confirmed infected.91 Granted, 
the death rate among those who are infected is quite high.  Infections have occurred in 
nine countries—all in Asia and the Middle East—but not yet on American soil.  Second, 
despite the relatively small impact and the apparently slow spread of the virus, fear of the 
disease has exploded, triggering a fair amount of government response on both the 
domestic and the international level, in a very short time period.  The government has 
responded by attributing money from the Department of Defense towards preventing a 
pandemic of this disease.  Consistent with the definition of human security, the foreign 
threat in this case is a disease.  People are looking to the government to combat it, and the 
government is taking steps to do so, both internationally and domestically, if it does 
arrive on our soil.  The government’s discourse on the subject has been a valuable 
indicator in itself, because public officials have alluded to the threat of the disease as 
similar to the threat of terrorism.  It is not a threat of another government with arms, but a 
naturally occurring disease with the potential to kill thousands, perhaps millions. As a 
case study, the avian flu clearly illustrates that the public as well as the government views 
diseases as a national security concern, and as a result, the government will take great 
action in not only protecting our own citizens from the disease, but also preventing its 
spread throughout the world.  
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We examined periodicals and other information about the avian flu from 2005 and 
until the beginning of February 2006, since this covers much of the recent threat of an 
outbreak.  I had to stop researching and begin writing my thesis in March 2006.  Even 
during February 2006, however, the number of articles continued to grow as the virus 
reached other areas of Africa and Europe.  While these arguments are based on the facts 
over the course of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, the subsequent events could skew the 
outcome of my argument.  But, regardless of the “outcome” of the avian flu – whether or 
not it results in a pandemic – at this time, it is apparent that the public response and the 
government action is in itself important, regardless of the final outcome. 
 In examining the avian flu as a case study, this chapter will address the following 
questions.  First, what is the public’s perception of the government’s role in preventing an 
avian flu outbreak and intervening in the event of an outbreak on U.S. soil?  Second, how 
has the United States government responded to the threat of avian flu?  This analysis will 
include policies set by the President and Congress, cooperation with foreign governments 
and international bodies, and various policies delegated to U.S. bureaucracies.  
Ultimately, this section will examine what the government’s response to the global threat 
of avian flu says about the U.S. definition of national security and the ways in which 
security issues are addressed by a multitude of U.S. actors. 
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PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 
 Most periodicals throughout the studied time period argue overwhelmingly that a 
pandemic is inevitable and that it is the responsibility of both local and federal 
governments to take action to prevent an outbreak or control it if it does occur.  Of 
course, many of their facts came from the government itself, with Health and Human 
Services Secretary Michael Leavitt often quoted.  In addition to Leavitt, the 
representatives from the Department of State have also been quoted in many articles, 
signifying their role in the issue, in not only taking action, but in being spokespeople that 
U.S. citizens look to when seeking solutions to the potential problem.  As articles 
overwhelmingly mention government officials, from those in the Department of Health 
and Human Services, to the State Department, to the United Nations, it is clear that the 
public has looked to the government rather than non-profits or private health practitioners 
for both information and protection from the avian influenza.  Furthermore, the dialogue 
present in most articles suggests that people expect the government not only to create 
strong infrastructures at home, but also to combat the disease worldwide in order to 
prevent its spread to our soil.  At no point in my studies have I come across any article or 
editorial arguing that the U.S. government should do less, either domestically or 
internationally.  If anything, the discourse within most articles compares the potential 
damages of an avian influenza pandemic to terrorism, and calls for more government 
action at every level to “protect” our citizens. 
 Like many articles, the National Review cites the Health and Human Services 
Secretary Michael Leavitt as saying earlier in October, “We are not prepared for a 
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pandemic.”92 This article also argues that the threat of a pandemic continues to be 
significant, even though by October 2005 it had only killed 60 people in Asia.  Since then 
the number of deaths has doubled, but this still gives no indication that a pandemic is on 
the way.  Like many other authors, Sally Pipes compares the threat to the 1918 Spanish 
flu epidemic, which also started among birds and is blamed for over 50 million deaths.93 
To prevent a pandemic, this article calls for more production of flu vaccinations.  It 
points out that the U.S. vaccine industry has declined from 26 companies in 1957 to a 
mere four today.  Flu vaccines are only produced for the U.S. market by two companies: 
“a French firm with a factory in Pennsylvania, and a California firm with a factory in 
Great Britain.”94 This refers to Sanofi-Pasteur and Chiron, respectively.  However, Pipes 
writes that producing vaccinations are expensive, from building the factory to getting the 
vaccination completed and inspected.  Lawsuits also dissuade companies from creating 
vaccines.  Yet in the end, Pipes also argues that American companies are not actively 
developing vaccines because the Food and Drug Administration imposes  “excessively 
strict screening.”95 While this article does not explicitly show that Americans view the 
threat of a pandemic as a security issue, it does display the seriousness of a pandemic as 
portrayed both by the government and by periodicals, as well as argue that the 
government should do more to protect its citizens from this threat. 
 An article in the Modesto Bee in Central California, argues that the large bird 
population in California’s Central Valley could be greatly threatened by the avian flu.  
The article is careful to note, however, that the threat to humans is slim since 
 
92 Sally Pipes, “Red Tape Choking Us,” National Review, October 17, 2005, 1. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
34
transmission to humans has been the exception, and transmission between humans has 
not occurred.96 Furthermore, it argues that extensive planning “is warranted not just 
because of avian flu, but because of the history of flu pandemics.  ‘We usually have three 
per century and it’s been more than (35 years) since we’ve had one,’ [Dr. John Walker, 
Stanislaus County’s public health officer] said.’”97 The article states, “Francine Bradley, 
poultry specialist with the University of California at Davis Cooperative Extension, said 
the disease has been found in birds in Siberia.  Certain birds are known to migrate from 
that region to Alaska, where they mingle with waterfowl that make an annual trek along 
the Pacific Flyway to California.”98 However, the article also points out that the area is 
somewhat prepared for the flu, as it has already taken measures to prevent terrorism and 
the West Nile virus.  With clear references to its preventive measures against terrorism, 
as well as its discussion of President Bush’s $7.1 billion plan for dealing with an avian 
flu pandemic, this article in a small local paper is another example of the widespread 
discourse that believes avian flu is an issue of national security and should be dealt with 
accordingly by governments at all levels. 
 An article in Texas’ Corpus Christi Caller-Times accurately reports that the 
spread of the virus among humans has been geographically limited, but suggests that 
citizens of Corpus Christi, Texas should be worried.  To curb fears, it stated that the city 
manager was in the process of developing a local plan.99 Furthermore, it argues that the 
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“country’s only defense” is Tamiflu.100 However, it warns, “But if the virus does adapt 
and begins spreading through humans like the common influenza strain, it could be 
apocalyptic with only limited amounts of anti-viral medication and a vaccine that has not 
yet been developed.”101 Another recurring theme in most articles is again stated here.  
“It’s not a matter of if, it’s a matter of when,” said Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s infectious diseases spokesman Dave Daidle.102 
However, it can be argued that the media has simply instigated unnecessary fear 
over the threat of a pandemic, and that this could be more of a cause for government 
action rather than actual concern by citizens.  In particular, one article in U.S. News and 
World Report in June 2005 was entitled “A Nightmare Scenario.”103 In this widely 
publicized report, the author writes that the avian flu could infect “as much as a quarter of 
the world’s population and kill as many 180 million to 360 million people—at least seven 
times the number of AIDS deaths, all within a matter of weeks.”104 The death toll varies 
vastly between 180 and 360 million—figures so broad they seem to be nothing less than 
rough guesstimates.  Unlike many articles, however, the author compares this to the 
normal yearly death rate from the ordinary flu, which kills between 1 and 2 million 
people worldwide.  The difference is obviously huge, although the average person 
probably would not be able to estimate the normal annual death rate.  This author 
intensifies his “nightmare scenario” by pointing out that only 300 million doses of flu 
vaccinations are produced each year, whereas the world’s population is closer to six 
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billion.105 In reality, for a variety of reasons, the entirety of the world’s population would 
not be receiving the vaccination anyway.  Perhaps this comparison is only a tactic to 
intensify the story and scare readers, exacerbating the potential of the situation.  
 As a solution, this article advocates for coordinated responses of “the medical 
community, of food providers, of transportation, and of care for first responders from 
public health, law enforcement, and emergency management at the international, federal, 
state, and local levels.”106 Quite clearly, the media has loudly advocated for broad 
government action, from the local to the international level.  In addition to coordinated 
responses, this article also calls for strengthening the World Health Organization.  Again, 
strengthening international institutions coincides with human security, strengthening 
international actors for the safety and security of the individual, regardless of nationality.  
Finally, the article argues, “The Bush administration must think of this as terrorism to the 
nth degree and immediately set up a senior-level emergency task force to develop a 
strategy.  It could serve as a permanent framework for curtailing the spread of future 
infectious diseases.”107 By comparing terrorism to the threat of the avian flu, this article 
blatantly blurs the distinction between the two threats.  Does it matter where the threat of 
massive loss to human life comes from?  According to U.S. News and World Reports,
apparently not.  Any major threat is considered a national security concern and should be 
a priority by the U.S. government.  One of their final sentences drives home their point, 
and the point of many other newspaper articles.  They write, “If avian flu were allowed to 
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develop into a pandemic, it would be a direct threat to our health, security, and 
prosperity.”108 
However, there has been some understanding that the hype around the avian flu 
has been more a pandemic of fear than an actual disease.  And, it is this fear that has 
unnecessarily prompted wide scale demand for government action.  An article in 
Maclean’s argues that there is “a tremendous amount of hysteria for something that 
hasn’t even happened—and may never happen, if past experience is any indication.”109 
This is in reference to previous threats of bio-terrorist attacks and other plagues that 
failed to originate.  Even with West Nile, SARS, and mad cow disease, “the amount of 
paranoia surrounding the threat has been exponentially larger than the threat itself.”110 
The threat has become a popular topic among bloggers, as well.  Globalization 
has therefore allowed for not only the flu to potentially be spread like wildfire, but it has 
also allowed fear to blaze across society even faster. Maclean’s reports:  
“Flu bloggers have developed a kind of online community,” says Crawford 
Kilian, a 64-year old communications teacher from Vancouver who started out 
blogging about SARS, but has since switched his focus to H5N1.  “But now, after 
watching what’s happened in New Orleans, I began biting my lip about ‘what if’ 
and ‘what’s more’,” he says.  “What if we get something like a hurricane and we 
get avian flu?  How do we cope with it then?”111 
Perhaps through the spread of fear, I believe that periodicals and blogs have made human 
security, especially in the context of the avian flu, a dominant theory among the general 
population.  When the mass of the population is fearful, and reporters and leaders are 
calling for government action, it does not matter whether the threat is a foreign military 
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or a disease, if the death toll is similarly atrocious.  Just as fear of an avian flu pandemic 
has spread, perhaps unnecessarily, so too has the notion of human security and the 
subsequent call for government action at every level.   
 One article, however, points out that fear surrounding avian flu is unfounded but 
not new.  It first compares today’s situation with the hype over the 1976 fear of a deadly 
“swine flu,” which failed to cause the projected “million” deaths.112 It also describes the 
SARS outbreak, which it states, “led to 750 stories in the New York Times and 
Washington Post,” which was the same number of deaths, it points out.113 The actual 
number of cases of SARS in the United States only amounted to 71, with no deaths.  
Clearly, the fear of SARS was highly exaggerated.  This article also argues that 
journalists, as well as public officials, are perpetuating fear.  It states, “What we can say 
with confidence is that there is never such a thing as helpful hysteria.  And the line 
between informing the public and starting a panic is being crossed every day now by 
politicians, public health officials, and journalists.”114 Specifically, the author argues that 
the media has tweaked the facts when writing about the avian flu.  It says that “the media 
have generally morphed the federal government’s leaked estimate of 200,000 to 1.9 
million deaths to simply ‘1.9 million deaths.’”115 In addition, it states that Dr. Irwin 
Redlener, director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia 
University claimed on ABC News’s Primetime on September 15, 2005, “We could have 
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a billion people dying worldwide.”116 Later, he apparently said that he meant a billion 
people could fall ill, not die.   
 A poll done by Harris Interactive sheds quantitative insight as to the public’s 
response to the threat of a pandemic.  The study finds that: 
 ...a majority (53%) of U.S. adults are either not very or not at all familiar with 
this virus and that a large number (41%) are not very or not at all concerned that 
the United States might be part of an avian flu pandemic in the near future.  
Despite this lack of familiarity and concern, majorities of adults believe that 
particular steps should be taken to prepare for a potential pandemic.117 
In addition, over 71% of adults surveyed think it is absolutely essential or very important 
to “develop plans to quickly provide medical supplies to areas of the globe that 
experience outbreaks of avian flu.”118 Sixty-one percent also agree that it is essential to 
invest government dollars in the development and production of avian flu vaccines.  
Media reports definitely suggest that the popular opinion is for government intervention 
throughout the world, but this poll further solidifies the argument. 
 Overall, the general public opinion as displayed in newspaper articles between 
2005 and the first months of 2006 overwhelmingly show a belief in human security.  
Comparisons between terrorism and the avian flu have been made time after time.  The 
nature of the threat is less important than the potential damage to human lives and the 
capacity and willingness of the government to take action, whether it be on domestic 
ground or in the international arena.  Let us now examine government response to these 
concerns. 
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GOVERNMENNT ACTION 
 
“Today I am announcing a new International Partnership on Avian and 
Pandemic Influenza... We invite all nations to participate.  It is essential we work 
together, and as we do so, we will fulfill a moral duty to protect our citizens, and heal 
the sick, and comfort the afflicted.” 
-- President George W. Bush, September 14, 2005 
 
As a case study, the avian flu shows the willingness of the U.S. government to 
participate in the global arena to prevent a pandemic.  It is quite significant that the 
government has allocated $7.1 billion to combat this threat, by pledging to strengthen 
international monitoring and prevention systems as well as by domestic preparedness.  
Policymakers have compared the possibility of a pandemic with terrorism.  A National 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza has been created to correspond to the National Security 
Strategy.  In general, there has been overwhelming consensus that this is not only a 
significant threat, but also one that should be addressed by the government at all levels, 
both internationally and domestically.  It is not something to be considered by public 
health officials alone, but by the Department of State and the Department of Defense as 
well.   
 The President and both parties in Congress have been quite vocal and have taken 
widespread action on this health security issue, which has been basically unprecedented 
in scale.  This is due to several factors.  First, the Bush administration has been a strong 
advocate of prevention policies because health security falls in line and is mutually 
consistent with the administration’s other international security goals of increasing 
democratic infrastructures abroad to protect our own citizens.  Second, the government 
has pursued avian flu prevention policies as damage control from the devastating effects 
of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina.  Third, both Republicans and Democrats have 
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acted on the issue so that each can be seen as “humanitarian” and as capable of 
addressing security issues, regardless of the nature of the threat. While each has 
sometimes tried to out-do the other party, the end result has generally been bi-partisan 
agreement. Again, this has been the result of general public uncertainty with national 
security and a fear about the possible impacts of globalization.  While the measures 
promised by the U.S. government have been relatively grand in terms of building local 
capacity and encouraging higher production of vaccinations, in reality, the measures have 
had little influence on global prevention programs.  This point helps show that when it 
comes down to it, the government will choose more domestically favorable measures 
instead of globally effective policies.  In the end, the government is not attempting to 
protect humans throughout the globe, but is seeking to protect its own citizens on the 
basis of human security.   This section will look at these factors of U.S. government 
action in preventing an avian flu pandemic, but will first give an overview of the National 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, the largest piece of policy on the issue.  It will finally 
argue that the U.S. has, indeed, added human security to its definition of national 
security.   
 
Overview of National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
 The main legislation to protect American citizens from an avian flu pandemic has 
been funding for President Bush’s National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, which was 
published by the Homeland Security Council in November 2005.  Legislation allocated 
$7.1 billion dollars to implement the National Strategy, but so far, the President’s plan 
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has been approved for $3.3 billion in funding this year and $2.65 billion for 2007. 119 The 
purpose of the Strategy is described:  
The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza guides our preparedness and 
response to an influenza pandemic, with the intent of (1) stopping, slowing or 
otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to the United States; (2) limiting the 
domestic spread of a pandemic, and mitigating disease, suffering and death; and 
(3) sustaining infrastructure and mitigating impact to the economy and the 
functioning of society.120 
Of the $7.1 billion dollars allocated, the largest portion—over $6 billion—will go 
towards research and stockpiling vaccinations.  Within this category, most funding will 
go towards purchasing vaccines for the Departments of Health and Human Services and 
Defense and the stockpiling of antiviral medications.  This leaves approximately $650 
million to prepare all levels of government to respond to an attack and approximately 
$251 million to detect and contain outbreaks before they spread worldwide.121 Bush’s 
plan gives the primary responsibility for creating stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral 
drugs to the federal government, but holds states and local governments responsible for 
delivering vaccines and controlling local outbreaks.122 According to Dr. Jeffrey S. 
Duchin, chief of communicable diseases for Seattle and King County health department, 
this figure [of $350 million allocated for 2006] is too small to accomplish the intended 
desired results.  He stated, “That $350 million sounds like a lot, but divided among 5,000 
health departments, it’s only $70,000 each.”123 While $7.1 billion may be a large 
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number, much of that sum is going towards purchasing vaccines rather than building 
local infrastructures or preventing outbreaks abroad before the disease reaches our soil.   
 
Consistency with the National Security Strategy 
 Bush’s avian flu strategy coincides with his administration’s goals both abroad 
and at home.  Abroad, the National Security Strategy advocates for U.S. internationalism, 
the aim of which is to help make the world not just safer but better.  In the aftermath of 
September 11, the 2002 National Security Strategy realizes the new security threats posed 
by terrorism.  In response, the Strategy focuses on pursuing freedom, democracy, and 
free enterprise around the world.124 By spreading these systems, which are founded in 
neo-liberalism, the Bush administration believes that it can create a safer world by 
preventing conditions that give rise to terrorism. In addition to specific promises to fight 
terrorism, these broader goals seek to spread American ideals throughout the world.   In 
fact, it sees its mission as a moral responsibility to spread the gifts of freedom and 
democracy, since the administration believes that these are fundamental human rights.  
When announcing the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza in 
September 2005, President Bush stated, “It is essential we work together, and as we do 
so, we will fulfill a moral duty to protect our citizens, heal the sick, and comfort the 
afflicted.”125 If the Bush administration can succeed in taking measures to prevent a 
pandemic, it will be seen as “humanitarian” in other areas.  In this way, the Bush 
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administration sought global action to help legitimize its other “humanitarian” goals, 
including democracy promotion in the Middle East. 
 Specifically, on the international level, Bush’s strategy includes $251 million 
from Congress “to help our foreign partners to train local medical personnel, expand their 
surveillance and testing capacity, draw up preparedness plans and take other vital actions 
to detect and contain outbreaks.”126 However, the “foreign partners” seem to only 
include Singapore and Indonesia at this point, with talks occurring in China.127 The 
rationale provided for this international approach is that,  “A flu pandemic would have 
global consequences. So no nation can afford to ignore this threat.  And every nation has 
responsibilities to detect and stop its spread.”128 This rhetoric is similar to Bush’s 
National Security Strategy.  Just as terrorism is the responsibility of all moral nations to 
fight, so too is controlling this infectious disease.  Morality is again a key term in 
justifying this cause, as is consistent with human security.  However, while he discusses 
the importance of this issue as one to be addressed by all nations, he refers to helping 
“our foreign partners” and does not mention international institutions such as the World 
Health Organization or the United Nations.  This clearly leads us into a political debate 
whether such organizations would be effective anyway, but it is important to recognize 
that “global prevention policies” are still considered within the context of strategic 
American diplomacy.   
 A second international aspect of President Bush’s plan includes an International 
Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, which was announced in September 2005 
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at the high-level segment of the United Nations General Assembly.  President Bush 
described this partnership on CNN in November 2005 as: 
...a global network of surveillance and preparedness that will help us to detect and 
respond quickly to any outbreaks of the diseases [sic].  The partnership requires 
participating countries that face an outbreak to immediately share information and 
provide samples to the [WHO].... Already 88 countries and nine international 
organizations have joined the effort.129 
A meeting with senior officials from these countries and organizations in October 2005 
resulted in the agreement of three priority areas for further action: “building stockpiles of 
drugs and supplies; speeding vaccine development and distribution; and implementing 
rapid response and containment measures.”130 Bush may be pursuing some international 
strategies to prevent a pandemic, but his primary tactic, both internationally and 
domestically, has been to increase the production of effective vaccines.  
 It is important to note two other areas of international involvement beyond the 
National Strategy.  The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) were collectively allocated $25 million 
for direct investment to foreign governments.  Secretary Leavitt (HHS) stated, “We have 
military, naval laboratories [in Asia] that form an important part of the public health 
construct for that region. We’ll primarily be investing in laboratory capacity, in 
surveillance, in training.”131 USAID has obligated $13.7 million to prevent the spread of 
avian flu in Southeast Asia.  Administrator Natsios indicated that $10 million of this was 
taken from the Emergency Supplemental Budget for the Tsunami, further showing that 
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these two situations are viewed similarly as threats to human security.132 Still, this $25 
million of foreign aid is small compared to other measures. 
 In its quest for global involvement in order to spread its values, it is no surprise 
that the Bush administration has attempted to take the lead on the prevention of an avian 
flu pandemic. Furthermore, its action on the issue has been consistent with the National 
Security Strategy in regards to its efforts on the home front.  This two-pronged approach 
of increased international involvement along with domestic security strategies—which 
can be seen in Bush’s policies of promoting freedom abroad while instituting the 
Department of Homeland Security—similarly applies to his approach on the avian flu.  
While attempting to have international input on the subject, he has been adamant about 
taking domestic measures.  In addition to preventing this specific threat, building up 
domestic infrastructures and response capacities will be beneficial in the face of other 
security threats, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or any other event in which 
people would need emergency assistance or direction on preventative measures.  Thus, by 
building up local capacity to prevent avian flu abroad and at home, the Bush 
administration is working to not only prevent an avian flu pandemic, but to prevent other 
threats and their impacts.  The administration’s policies on the avian flu are not, 
therefore, solely in response to the threat of this specific pandemic, but are in 
coordination with its grand strategy. 
 Specific domestic measures undertaken by the administration include a National 
Bio-surveillance Initiative to “help us rapidly detect, quantify and respond to outbreaks of 
disease in humans and animals, and deliver information quickly to state, local, and 
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national and international public health officials....”133 The second main component of 
Bush’s domestic strategy is to stockpile vaccinations and antiviral drugs and to develop 
new vaccine technologies.  To deal with the avian flu in the short term, Bush has asked 
Congress for $1.2 billion “for the Department of Health and Human Services to purchase 
enough doses of this vaccine [based on the current strain of the avian flu virus] from 
manufacturers to vaccinate 20 million people.”134 Stockpiling antiviral drugs is another 
measure, for which Bush has asked Congress $1 billion, in order to “treat first responders 
and those on the front lines, as well as populations most at risk in the first stages of a 
pandemic.”135 Thus, most of President Bush’s plan involves the research and production 
of antiviral vaccinations.  The third part of his domestic strategy involves creating 
emergency plans in every state and community in order to respond to an outbreak. 136 
When outlining these strategies, Bush makes it clear that they will not only be 
beneficial in the event of an avian flu pandemic, but in other cases as well.  He states:  
The steps I have outlined will also help our nation in other critical ways.  By 
perfecting cell-based technologies now, we will be able to produce vaccines for a 
range of illnesses and save countless lives.  By strengthening our domestic 
vaccine industry, we can help ensure that our nation will never again have a 
shortage of vaccine for seasonal—seasonal flu.  And by putting in place and 
exercising pandemic emergency plans across the nation, we can help our nation 
prepare for other dangers – such as a terrorist attack using chemical or biological 
weapons.137 
For Bush, the threat of an avian flu provides the political space and opportunity to devote 
a significant amount of money to building general domestic infrastructures that can be 
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useful in other situations.  While Bush has no doubt been committed to this issue, the 
political landscape has allowed him to use the issue to take measures he might not have 
otherwise been able to implement.  
 In addition, this domestic policy shows that the nature of the response to any 
“security threat” is all very similar.  With the indiscriminate nature of terrorism—similar 
to diseases and natural disasters—the new response is not just a buildup of military and 
weapons but a strengthening of local response programs and the national stockpiling of 
resources, such as vaccines.  Justifying measures taken to control an avian flu outbreak 
by relating them to other national threats signifies their similarities in the view of the 
present administration, furthering the idea that national security is now based on human 
security and the prerogative to protect citizens from a plethora of threats. 
 The symbolism of the name of this policy—the “National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza”—is quite significant.  Since the language reflects the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 and the document clearly states that it is consistent with the National 
Security Strategy as well as the National Strategy for Homeland Security, it is clear that 
the administration is regarding the issue seriously as one of national security.  (However, 
it is important to note that the Strategy addresses influenza broadly, rather than just 
focusing on the avian influenza, even though it has clearly been created in this specific 
context.)  The Strategy begins with a warning that “the next pandemic is likely to come in 
waves, each lasting months, and pass through communities of all size across the nation 
and the world.”  The Strategy also makes the distinction of the type of threat with which 
we are dealing by writing that “it will ultimately threaten all critical infrastructure by 
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removing essential personnel from the workplace for weeks or months.”138 Thus, in 
addition to the obvious loss of human lives, the administration sees it as a greater threat 
to economic productivity.  While the more specific short-term action is specified in 
legislation, this Strategy signifies the seriousness with which the administration regards a 
potential influenza pandemic. 
 
Congressional Rhetoric and Partisanship  
 While Democrats and Republicans have varied slightly in the ways in which 
prevention and intervention should be handled, the general consensus by both parties has 
been that the threat of a pandemic is real and that the government must act both 
domestically and internationally.  This has led to a fair amount of government action 
despite the fact that the disease has not spread from human-to-human and has remained 
fairly isolated.  Both parties want to be seen as “humanitarian” and as capable of 
preventing security disasters.  Thus, policymakers have repeatedly made comparisons 
between the potential impact of a pandemic flu and the damages caused by both 
September 11 and Hurricane Katrina.  For Republicans, the avian flu has been an 
opportunity to assert their power in the wake of these events and the Iraq War.  For 
Democrats, it has been an opportunity to get their foot in the door on a security issue, an 
area that Republicans have typically dominated.  Pursuing prevention strategies has also 
been important for Democrats to show that they have the ability to prevent such 
catastrophes. While the threats of disease, terrorism and natural disasters are all very 
different, they are similar in that they can result in massive loss to human life and damage 
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to the economy.  It is this similarity that is important to policymakers, and since this is 
one case where such devastations can be prevented, both parties are taking up arms.  
Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) clearly compared the threat of the bird flu with the 
devastations caused by September 11.  At a Woodrow Wilson Center Forum he stated:  
It is potentially an unprecedented threat to the American people many magnitudes 
greater than 9/11, and we can’t afford to be penny-wise and pound-foolish.  We 
can’t afford to delay any longer.  And we can’t afford preparation timelines that 
stretch out to 2009 and 2010....  Most of what we’re talking about here spills over 
into what the 9/11 commission talked about in terms of lack of local 
preparedness.... And the fact, I think, that the possibility of this hitting us is 
greater than any kind of terrorist activity.  A terrorist activity might kill a few 
people.  You’re talking about hundreds of thousands of Americans dying.  And it 
really would set off a pandemonium in this country.139 
Clearly, the threat may exist and these deaths could potentially become reality.  I am not 
discounting that the American public should be aware of such a threat and its seriousness.  
However, terrorism and disease are two very different issues.  While they share similar 
outcomes, the ways in which they must be addressed are quite distinct.  Indeed this 
comparison helps portray the potential seriousness of a flu pandemic, but it also serves to 
show that policymakers are still trying to “make up” for any mistakes that may have led 
to September 11, and that policymakers are making the comparison in order to garner 
support for new policies, thus portraying them as “security-minded” and “tough.”  In 
reality, while there are definite measures to protect against the spread of an infectious 
disease, diseases operate in very different ways from terrorists.  According to public 
opinion as discussed earlier in this chapter, it is important for government officials to be 
concerned with both threats, but it seems that by making the close comparison between 
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disease and terrorism, policymakers are trying to show that they are capable of protecting 
citizens, no matter what the danger. 
 Similarly, legislators have remarked that the devastations of Katrina must not 
reoccur through an avian flu pandemic.  In a news conference on avian flu held by 
Democrats in November, Senator Barrack Obama (D-IL) stated that “...the United States 
cannot afford to have an Katrina-level preparedness or a Katrina-like response to an 
international outbreak of avian flu.”  In his remarks, he also compared the U.S. pandemic 
preparedness plans to those of Japan, France and England, who have “stockpiled enough 
Tamiflu [antiviral vaccine] to cover a quarter of their population.  With enough to cover 
just 2 percent of our population, the United States is, again, not one of those 
countries.”140 While Tamiflu clearly would not have much impact when faced with 
another hurricane, drawing images of recent events has been a common tactic by 
Democrats to argue that more must be done before we make the same mistakes and 
repeat history. 
As seen above in the National Strategy, Republicans are looking to vaccines as 
the primary solution to a potential pandemic.  While much of Bush’s rhetoric has focused 
on international policies and local infrastructure, when it comes down to the numbers, 
faith lies in the power of vaccines.  Private pharmaceutical companies end up winning 
big.   Despite the fact that the overall Strategy calls for a large chunk of taxpayer money, 
most of the money will go to private companies, a policy that is consistent with general 
Republican beliefs in the private sector. According to Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Michael Leavitt, the U.S. lags behind others in terms of its stockpile.  He said, 
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“In 1997, the World Health Organization recommended that each country stockpile at 
least enough for 25 percent.  France and Britain now have enough stockpiled for 25 
percent; we only have 2 percent in America.  So obviously, we’re playing catch-up 
ball.”141 However, the United States has already taken some measures after September 
11 and the anthrax scare.  Secretary Leavitt reported, “The Strategic National Stockpile – 
stores of antibiotics, disinfectants, intravenous hookups and other emergency supplies—
sits on rolling pallets in warehouses around the country, ready to be delivered within 12 
hours.”142 We must also not forget that our nation faced large shortages of flu vaccines 
the past few years before the threat of an avian flu was even serious.  The administration 
faced criticism earlier when not being prepared with vaccines; this policy is thus ensuring 
that similar circumstances are not repeated, especially in the event of a larger pandemic.  
 In contrast to viewing vaccines as the primary tool, Democrats have been more 
adamant about even more government involvement, both in taking preventative measures 
abroad and in building up local infrastructure.  Democrats have also stressed the 
seriousness of the threat and have hence argued that the administration has not done 
enough. During a hearing of the House International Relations Committee in December 
2005, Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) argued: 
I am singularly unimpressed by the administration’s proposal to spend only 3 
percent of its $7 billion avian flu budget on tackling the virus where it is already 
emerging: in markets and small villages across the continent of Asia.  We should 
be channeling our funds to reducing the chance that avian flu will mutate into a 
highly transmittable form, detecting outbreaks when they occur and controlling 
the spread of outbreaks to avoid a global pandemic….143 
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Representative Lantos has also called for more support of the United Nations and the 
World Health Organization, which are taking their own measures.  Similarly, Senator 
Harkin’s number one priority is “to dramatically step up international surveillance of 
avian flu outbreaks overseas.”144 
Senator Harkin has also described the issue as “a national emergency,” and thus, 
“it ought to be paid for as an emergency.... [and] be backed by the federal 
government.”145 This is interesting because despite the gravity in his statement, there has 
been no detection of the disease, whether in a bird or in a human, on U.S. soil.  Yet it is 
clear that the Democrats regard the issue with much urgency.  Senator Harkin has also 
criticized Republicans for removing funding from the avian flu prevention bill.  House 
Majority Leader Roy Blunt was also quoted as saying that the Republicans did not think 
there was a “compelling need” for funding and that it could wait another year.146 
Democrats have also criticized the President’s plan in its effectiveness.  Senator 
Obama argues that, “the plan does not lay out a clear chain of command in the event of a 
crisis.”  He says, “It’s unclear whether the Department of Homeland Security or the 
Department of Health and Human Services will lead the response effort.”147 In response, 
Senator Obama has advocated for a single person who will work with all agencies and 
have access to the president in order to streamline the chain of command.148 And while 
Senator Harkin has advocated for more international action, he has also been critical of 
the government’s policies around state and local preparedness, referring to them as the 
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“weakest link.”149 Indeed, Democrats have used the opportunity of this looming threat to 
try to show that they are capable of protecting citizens, more so than the party in power, 
by pointing to Republicans’ past and current mistakes.  However, only hindsight will be 
able to judge which plan of attack has been best. 
 
Avian Flu is a Security Issue 
 The rhetoric in Congress has echoed Bush’s remarks that this potential pandemic 
is, in fact, a security issue.  In addition to arguing that both domestic and international 
action on the issue is imperative for moral reasons, members of Congress also stress the 
seriousness of health security because diseases are indiscriminate and difficult to control 
within borders, especially due to globalization.  This rhetoric further shows that the avian 
flu is thought of as an issue of national security, and one that must be dealt with both 
abroad and at home in various capacities.  Just the fact that the International Relations 
Committee in the House of Representatives took on the issue as its own reflects its 
seriousness.  In a hearing of this committee in December 2005, Representative Henry 
Hyde (R-IL) clearly argued that the avian flu is a key concern of the committee because it 
is a global threat and because the nature of the disease is such that it is difficult to detect 
and control.  In order to protect U.S. citizens, Senator Hyde calls for containing an 
outbreak “beyond the borders of the U.S.”150 This threat is not one that should be only 
prevented domestically, but one that needs to be addressed internationally in order to 
truly be most effective. 
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Additionally, it is very interesting that the Pandemic Influenza Act, one of the 
first pieces of legislation to prevent an avian flu pandemic, was made as an amendment to 
the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations bill (along with emergency 
supplemental appropriations to address hurricanes in the gulf of Mexico).151 Senator 
Harkin defended this amendment by saying that “it should have been on the Labor, 
Health and Human Services bill... but we didn’t have a Labor, Health and Human 
Services bill and we didn’t know if we were going to get one, so that’s why I put on 
DOD.  But as I said, we prevailed and it was put on the bill.”152 Although it seems 
Senator Harkin would have preferred the amendment to not be on the Department of 
Defense bill, it is significant that measures to prevent the spread of a disease were 
included with the DOD, a department traditionally concerned with weapons and warfare. 
 Senator Harkin made other remarks that indicate his view that the avian flu can 
and should be considered within the Department of Defense, because of its capacity for 
destruction.  He compared the avian flu to Pearl Harbor, drawing parallels between the 
impacts of disease and war.  He says:  
...it’s interesting to note that today our topic is avian flu, and today is December 
7th, the anniversary of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s attack on Pearl Harbor.  Let’s 
be clear: when a flu pandemic hits—and experts say it is indeed, a matter of 
when, not if—it won’t be a sneak attack we’ve been warned about for years, one 
which we’ve been attacked before....  The allusion to Pearl Harbor is relevant in 
another respect, because avian flu is more than just a public health issue.  It’s a 
threat to our national security, a threat to our economy of the first order.153 
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As an advocate of government involvement to prevent a flu pandemic, it is clear that 
Senator Harkin views this as a serious security issue.   
 In a hearing by the House International Relations Committee discussing the avian 
flu, Representative James A. Leach (R-IA) argued more broadly for government 
protection against all disease by committing to health security.  He stated:  
…it’s self-evident that the greatest foreign policy issue of our time is neither the 
problem of war and peace between nation-states and our other problem, terrorism, 
but rather the human vulnerability to disease we all share. The global spread of 
the HIV virus and the mounting threat of the first avian pandemic in the new 
century have begun to focus public attention on this fact…. Yet what is self-
evident is that we have... the capacity to act, and failure to do so could be the 
single greatest failure of public policy and public duty in our lifetime.154 
While Congress has been focused on taking action on the avian flu, it is obvious that 
larger debates about health security are circling. 
 
Health Security and Borders  
 Clearly, the avian flu is being considered a security issue, yet the ways in which 
diseases must be fought are obviously different than traditional concerns.  It is implied 
that disease is something that can be fought and controlled by nation-states.  Fighting 
diseases, however, is something relatively new in the U.S. security arena, and discussions 
around the avian flu make this clear.   
 First, diseases do not recognize barriers posed by borders.  This raises 
considerable questions about the capacity of the nation-state or the nation-state system to 
be effective.  Senator Harkin recognizes this issue.  He stated, “An avian flu pandemic is 
going to move across state lines—they don’t recognize boundaries, it doesn’t recognize 
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boundaries.  It’s going to be a national crisis.  It’s going to require a federal response.  
It’s just not reasonable to expect each state to independently come up with this kind of 
infrastructure and this capacity.”155 While Senator Harkin argues that our federal 
government must be the one to take the lead on this issue because domestic states cannot, 
by themselves, be completely effective, the same must be considered at the international 
level.  Bush’s Influenza Strategy has identified international capacity building, but his 
primary emphasis and congressional action has been on domestic policies.  Perhaps this is 
partly due to politics and these actors’ positions as elected officials.   
 In contrast, the Department of State has advocated for more international 
involvement, as is to be expected.  (Yet again, involvement by the State Department 
demonstrates the significance of this security issue.)  Dr. Paula J. Dobriansky, Under 
Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs, stated, “Since diseases do not 
respect borders, an effective global response is critical... Indeed, dealing with avian 
influenza before it reaches our border is a necessary form of forward defense.”156 Under 
Secretary Dobriansky also discussed the State Department’s role.  She stated:  
The Department of State is involved because the only way to avoid the much 
higher potential toll of a flu pandemic is in concert with other nations.  This issue 
requires the involvement of not only Ministers of Health and Agriculture but also 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Executive Offices of Presidents and Prime 
Ministers.157 
The difficulties of controlling a disease when considered a security threat are 
complicated when observing the international political arena.  Officials have been 
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especially worried about the avian influenza outbreaks in Africa and other areas of weak 
infrastructure for fear that the lack of awareness of the disease and a failure to report 
could lead to a serious outbreak that would be difficult to control.  While we cannot 
practically control all areas of the world, we must be worried about the ways in which 
other states are dealing with (or are not dealing with) the issue, for it could have a huge 
effect on our own security.  Similarly, there should be concerns about outbreaks of the 
disease in war-torn areas.  The devastation caused by the Spanish influenza in 1918 was 
magnified by warfare.  While today’s wars are fought much differently, an outbreak of 
the avian flu in Iraq, for instance, could have major effects on the war’s outcome and the 
rebuilding of that nation.  In addition to posing a risk to our own troops, an outbreak 
would be quite politically damaging.  Iraq has already seen a 15-year-old girl die of the 
bird flu within its borders in January 2006.  The New York Times reported, “The finding 
suggests that the virus may be spreading widely—and undetected—among birds in 
Central Asia, which is poorly equipped to identify and report infections, officials said.”158 
A spokeswoman for the WHO stated her concern that we have seen the first signs of the 
bird flu in Iraq in humans, rather than birds, which “points to serious gaps in 
surveillance.”159 This is almost to be expected in a country trying to re-build in such 
conditions.  However, this example points to the necessity for our government to commit 
to measures to prevent a major outbreak in Iraq and the Middle East, at least for political 
reasons.   
 
158 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “In First Iraqi Case, Bird Flu Kills Girl in North,” New York 
Times, January 31, 2006.   
159 Ibid., 1.   
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CONCLUSION
While fear around an avian flu pandemic may be justified, the United States 
government has taken a fair amount of action and has engaged in a significant amount of 
dialogue around the prevention of a pandemic.  Most of this discourse and activity has 
been geared towards proving their capacity in addressing security concerns, or their 
capability to protect American lives against whatever threat might be present.  This is 
quite worrying when one realizes that prevention and intervention policies are being 
created with politics—not science—in mind.  Perhaps this is a theme among many 
administrations, but it seems apparent that current leadership is pursuing politics instead 
of science, perhaps endangering citizens by not fully appreciating scientific expertise.  
True it is difficult to “predict” a pandemic, but those quoted (or misquoted) in the media 
have predominately been bureaucrats, not epidemiologists or other scientists.  One must 
wonder whether or not domestic and international policies would be different if experts 
were offered stronger input in decision-making.   
 We must also question whether this has become such a high-profile issue for 
political or scientific reasons.  Is the avian flu truly a threat?  Or has it been made to be 
seen as such for political reasons—to raise legitimacy for an administration that has been 
questioned on its ability to provide security, both domestically and abroad?  If the latter is 
true, which I fear it is, our leadership (both in White House and Congress) may have 
unnecessarily heightened fears and anxieties.  It is important that measures have been 
taken to strengthen preparedness and response systems, but this could have been done 
without creating something close to mass hysteria. 
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Yet regardless of reasons why, by putting such time and resources towards 
preventing an avian flu pandemic, the government has legitimized the threat of disease as 
a security issue.   The repercussions of this precedent may be quite large.  In the past, 
national security has been focused on protecting citizens from foreign militaries.  Now, in 
the age of militant action by non-state actors, the United States has had to expand its 
definition of national security.  It has gone even farther to place public health issues 
under the category of “national security,” requiring government action both at home and 
abroad.  What will this mean for the future?   
 With the proliferation of emerging and re-emerging diseases throughout the 
globe, as well as the increasing speed and depth at which diseases can potentially spread 
due to globalization, our government, as well as many others throughout the world, may 
not only add infectious diseases to the list of potential national security threats, but may 
slowly shift their focus towards these threats.  Instead of being concerned with countries 
with large militaries or terrorist organizations, countries with poor health infrastructures 
or high amounts of disease might become our worst enemies.  Will there be a day when 
we give more money to foreign countries to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases than to support their military? Actions to prevent an avian flu pandemic have 
been primarily focused on vaccine production, with some degree of building local 
capacity and strengthening foreign prevention and response systems.  This may have 
been the right decision for this issue in the context of current politics and in the view of 
the current administration, but what other ways can governments fight diseases, both 
within our borders and beyond?  A few other possible solutions may be to improve 
infrastructures throughout the world, including access to adequate health care, clean 
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water, pest control, virus detection, and education.  If these tactics become more accepted 
as ways to protect American citizens by preventing diseases from spreading in the first 
place, this will dramatically change the way in which we structure our foreign policy, 
foreign aid, and national defense.   
 Another outcome might be substantial international cooperation for successful 
“campaigns” against such diseases. When every person on the globe faces the same threat 
to their life, perhaps nations will finally work together for the sake of humanity.  In 
theory, such cooperation could occur through the auspices of the United Nations or the 
World Health Organization, yet in practice this is unlikely.  How might cooperation occur 
instead?  Perhaps increased bilateral agreements will be the result, as is happening today.  
But will this be enough for true global coordination?  Domestically, states may begin to 
see more federal money for increasing emergency response systems.  So far they have 
received some, but greater threats will only encourage the federal government to ensure 
that the local level is more prepared.   
 Despite the trends moving towards human security, there is still the possibility 
that this trend could reverse itself.  Perhaps such high government involvement is simply 
an anomaly, a result of other circumstances such as September 11 and Hurricane Katrina.  
Indeed it is crucial that we think about security not inside a vacuum; while the avian flu 
has been an issue of greater importance than in the past, our military has also grown 
substantially due to the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq.  It is unreasonable to 
speculate whether or not diseases would be of greater concern without these other “hard 
security” issues occurring simultaneously.  Yet the fact that the government has put so 
much effort to the prevention of this disease, while concurrently scrambling to fund a 
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war-in-progress further shows its significance.  Our government may not seek to prevent 
the spread of all diseases, and its efforts may be still very limited, especially when 
compared to the scope of funding for military campaigns, but I believe that it is 
nevertheless moving in the direction towards human security.   
 Additionally, our government has vested interest in improving health worldwide 
and preventing against the spread of diseases because diseases may become the new 
explicit weapon by terrorists.  Never mind the intrinsic threat of diseases; bio-terrorism is 
another serious concern on its own.  While the best ways in which bio-terrorism should 
be fought is arguable, strengthening local reporting and response systems can only be 
beneficial in this type of situation.  Thus, for the sake of preventing human harm by 
disease, whether it is fabricated or natural, the government should continue to build upon 
its human security policies.  September 11 may have been devastating to the United 
States, but a pandemic could be thousands times more devastating to the world.  We must 
continue to learn from our mistakes and be prepared for future threats—whether they are 
as large as atomic bombs or as small as microbes. 
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APPENDIX A: Charts and Graphs to Display Definitions of Human Security
Traditional and human security: Comparative Aspects160 
Traditional Security     Human Security 
Territorially Sovereign    Not necessarily spatially oriented 
State       Community and individual 
Diplomatic and Military    Socio-political, socio-economic,  
 environmental 
Institutionalized     Non-institutionalized 
Formal (political     Informal (intuitive) 
Structured Violence     Unstructured Violence 
Diplomatic and military; unilateral   Scientific, technological; multilateral 
 governance 
Classification of Security Studies by Roland Paris161 
Source of Security Threat? 
 
Security for 
Whom?
 
160 William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur, and In-Taek Hyun, eds., Asia’s Emerging Regional 
Order (New York: United Nations, 2002) 20.  As extracted from George MacLean, “The 
United Nations and the New Security Agenda” 
(http://www.unac.org/canada/security/maclean.html)
161 Sabina Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security: Working Paper 2” 
(Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity).  Extracted 
from Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 
26:2 (2001) 98. 
 Military Military, Non-military, 
both 
States National Security 
(Realism) 
Redefined Security 
(e.g., environmental 
and economic 
[cooperative or 
comprehensive] 
security) 
Societies, 
Groups, 
Individuals
Intrastate Security
(e.g., civil war, 
ethnic conflict, and 
democide) 
Human Security 
(e.g., environmental 
and economic threats to 
the survival of 
societies, groups, and 
individuals) 
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APPENDIX B: National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza162 
Funding Breakdown:  
 Detect and contain outbreaks before they spread worldwide  $251 million 
 Accelerate development of cell-culture technology   $2.8 billion 
 Development of new treatments and vaccines   $800 million 
 Departments of Health and Human Services and Defense to  
 purchase influenza vaccines     $1.519 billion 
 Stockpile antiviral medications     $1.029 billion 
 Prepare all levels of government to respond to a pandemic  $644 million 
Total:         $7.1 billion 
 
National Strategy for Pandemic Flu 
4%
39%
11%
22%
15%
9%
Contain outbreaks worldwide
Development of cell-culture
technology
Development of new vaccines
Influenza vaccines for HHS and
DOD
Stockpile antiviral medications
Prepare all levels of government
to respond
 
National Strategy for Pandemic Flu: Main Points163 
Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication 
• We will support pandemic planning efforts, and clearly communicate expectations 
to individuals, communities and governments, whether overseas or in the United 
States, recognizing that all share the responsibility to limit the spread of infection 
in order to protect populations beyond their borders. 
• A critical element of pandemic planning is ensuring that people and entities not 
accustomed to responding to health crises understand the actions and priorities 
 
162 The White House, “Pandemic Flu: Preparing and Protecting Against Avian 
Influenza,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/pandemicflu/ (Accessed April 19, 2006.) 
163 Homeland Security Council, “National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza,” November 
2005. 
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required to prepare for and respond to a pandemic. Those groups include political 
leadership at all levels of government, non-health components of government and 
members of the private sector. Essential planning also includes the coordination 
of efforts between human and animal health authorities.   
• In combination with traditional public health measures, vaccines and antiviral 
drugs form the foundation of our infection control strategy. Vaccination is the 
most important element of this strategy, but we acknowledge that a two-pronged 
strategy incorporating both vaccines and antivirals is essential. 
• Research and develop vaccines, antivirals, adjuvants and diagnostics represents 
our best defense against a pandemic. To realize our goal of next-generation 
countermeasures against influenza, we must make significant and targeted 
investments in promising technologies.  
 
Pillar Two: Surveillance and Detection 
• Early warning of a pandemic and our ability to closely track the spread of avian 
influenza outbreak is critical to being able to rapidly employ resources to contain 
the spread of the virus. An effective surveillance and detection system will save 
lives by allowing us to activate our response plans before the arrival of a 
pandemic virus to the U.S., activate additional surveillance systems and initiate 
vaccine production and administration. 
• Although influenza does not respect geographic or political borders, entry to and 
egress from affected areas represent opportunities to control or at the very least 
slow the spread of infection.  
 
Pillar Three: Response and Containment 
• We recognize that a virus with pandemic potential anywhere represents a risk to 
populations everywhere. Once health authorities have signaled sustained and 
efficient human-to-human spread of the virus has occurred, a cascade of response 
mechanisms will be initiated, from the site of the documented transmission to 
locations around the globe. 
• The most effective way to protect the American population is to contain an 
outbreak beyond the borders of the U.S. While we work to prevent a pandemic 
from reaching our shores, we recognize that slowing or limiting the spread of the 
outbreak is a more realistic outcome and can save many lives.  
• Rather than generating a focal point of casualties, the medical burden of a 
pandemic is likely to be distributed in communities across the nation for an 
extended period of time.  
• Movement of essential personnel, goods and services, and maintenance of critical 
infrastructure are necessary during an event that spans months in any given 
community. The private sector and critical infrastructure entities must respond in 
a manner that allows them to maintain the essential elements of their operations 
for a prolonged period of time, in order to prevent severe disruption of life in our 
communities.  
• Effective risk communication is essential to inform the public and mitigate panic.  
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APPENDIX C: Avian Flu Congressional Activity164 
Senate Hearings: 
“Role of U.S. Agriculture in the Control and Eradication of Avian Influenza” 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry 
November 17, 2005 
 
“UN Efforts to Combat Avian Flu” 
Congressional Global Health Caucus and United Nations Foundation News 
Conference/Briefing 
November 15, 2005 
 
“Avian Influenza – Are We Prepared?” 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
November 9, 205 
 
“Pandemic Influenza” 
Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee for Labor/HHS/Education 
November 2, 2005 
 
“21st century Biological Threats” 
Senate Subcommittee on Bioterrorism/Public Health Preparedness, HELP Committee 
May 11, 2005  
House Hearings: 
“Statement of Jim Kolbe” 
Congressional hearing on Avian Flu 
March 2, 2006 
 
“Statement of Dr. Ron DeHaven, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service” 
U.S. Department of Agriculture to the House Agriculture Committee 
November 16, 2005 
 
“Avian Flu: Addressing the Global Threat” 
House Committee on International Relations 
December 7, 2005 
 
“Review of the Prevention, Detection, and Eradication of Avian Influenza” 
House Committee on Agriculture – Public Hearing 
November 16, 2005 
 
“Pandemic Flu Plan Assessment” 
 
164 “Avian Flu Congressional Activity,” Global Health Council, www.globalhealth.org
(Accessed April 9, 2006). 
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House Energy and Commerce Committee, Full Committee Hearing 
November 8, 2005 
 
“Pandemic Influenza” 
House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee for Labor/HHS/Education 
November 2, 2005 
 
“The Next Flu Pandemic: Evaluations of U.S. Readiness” 
House Committee on Government Reform 
June 30, 2005 
 
“Threat of and Planning for Pandemic Flu”  
House Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
May 26, 2005 
 
“Efforts to Prevent Pandemic by Air Travel” 
House Subcommittee on Aviation of Committee on Transport and Infrastructure 
April 6, 2005 
 
Senate Legislation: 
S. 1912 Global Network for Avian Influenza Surveillance Act 
Sen. Lieberman (D-CT); no co-sponsors 
Would establish a global network for avian influenza surveillance among wild birds 
nationally and internationally to combat the growing threat of bird flu; Introduced 
October 24, 2005 
 
S.AMDT.2283 to HR 3010 (Labor-HHS FY2006 Appropriations) 
Sen. Harkin (D-IA); 10 co-sponsors 
Would allocate nearly $8 billion for comprehensive national effort to prepare for avian 
flu pandemic; Passed October 27, 2005. 
 
S. 1880 National Biodefense and Pandemic Preparedness Act 
Sen. Kennedy (D-MA); 7 co-sponsors 
Would amend the PHS Act to enhance biodefense and pandemic preparedness activities; 
Introduced October 17, 2005. 
 
S. 1873 Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act 
Sen. Burr (R-NC); 6 co-sponsors 
Would prepare and strengthen the biodefenses of the United States against deliberate, 
accidental, and natural outbreaks of illness; Introduced October 17, 2005. 
 
S. 1828 Influenza Security Act 
Sen. Clinton (D-NY); 2 co-sponsors 
Would amend PHS Act to secure adequate supply of influenza vaccine; Introduced 
October 6, 2005. 
 
68
S. 1821 Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act 
Sen. Reid (D-NV); 14 co-sponsors 
Would amend PHS Act to prepare for influenza pandemic; Introduced October 5, 2005. 
 
S. 969 Attacking Viral Influenza Across Nations 
Sen. Obama (D-IL); 9 co-sponsors 
Would amend PHS Act to prepare for influenza pandemic; Introduced April 28, 2005. 
 
S. 975 Project BioShield II 
Sen. Lieberman (D-NH); 2 co-sponsors 
Would provide incentives to increase research by private sector entities to develop 
medical countermeasures; Introduced April 28, 2005. 
House Legislation: 
HR 4603 Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza Act of 2005 
December 16, 2005 
To amend the Public Health Service Act with respect to pandemic influenza, and for 
other purposes.  Appropriation is authorized to carry out this title $750,000 for fiscal 
year 2007.   
 
HR 4476 Global Network for Avian Influenza Surveillance Act 
December 8, 2005 
To establish a global network for avian influenza surveillance among wild birds 
nationally and internationally to combat the growing threat of bird flu, and for other 
purposes. 
 
HR 4396 National Vaccine Authority  
Rep Joseph Crowley (D-NY); 1 co-sponsor 
Would establish the National Vaccine Authority within the Department of Health and 
Human Services; Introduced November 18, 2005. 
 
HR 4392 
Rep. Thomas Allen (D-ME); no co-sponsors 
Would provide for the importation of pharmaceutical products under a compulsory 
license as provided for under the World Trade Organization; Introduced November 18, 
2005. 
 
HR 4358 Influenza Vaccine Emergency Act 
Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR); 11 co-sponsors 
Would amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for emergency distributions of 
influenza vaccine; Introduced November 17, 2005. 
 
HR 4245 Influenza Preparedness and Prevention Act of 2005 
Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-CA); 6 co-sponsors 
Would provide for programs and activities with respect to pandemic influenza; 
Introduced November 7, 2005. 
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HR 4062 Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act 
Rep. Lowey (D-NY) 
Would amend PHS Act to prepare for influenza pandemic; Introduced October 27, 2005. 
 
HR 2863 Department of Defense FY2006 Appropriations 
Original Senate amendment from Sen. Harkin (D-IA); 10 co-sponsors 
Would allocate $3.9 billion for avian flu preparedness; Reported October 7, 2005. 
 
HR 3369 Attacking Viral Influenza Across Nations Act of 2005 
July 20, 2005 
To amend the Public Health Service Act with respect to preparation for an influenza 
pandemic, including an avian influenza pandemic, and for other purposes.  There are 
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act (and 
the amendments made by this Act) for each of the fiscal years 2006 through 2010. 
 
HR 1268 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 
Provided $25 million too USAID to prevent and control the spread of avian flu; Signed 
by President May 11, 2005. 
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